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nally NATO. Croatia must not and will not stay isolated
from European and global integrations. This does not
imply that it will not accept its share of responsibility for
the further stabilisation of the political situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and in its eastern neighbourhood. How-
ever, by accepting co-operation, Croatia needs to keep on
stressing that it cannot be the hostage ofthe neighbouring
region, and that the dynamics of its ascension to the above
mentioned associations depend only on the development
of the situation in south-eastern Europe.
In keeping with such considerations, and always
bearing in mind the firm protection of the fundamental
national and state interests, in the upcoming period, Croatia
will reinforce its efforts to start the first round ofnegotia-
tions in view of joining the PHARE programme and the
negotiations regarding the Co-operation agreement. This
will be done by means of an ongoing dialogue and co-
operation, and by entreating the European Union to show
a more affirmative and constructive approach. The
normalisation of the situation in the Croatian Danubian
region has opened the door for the stepping up ofthe lob-
bying activity in view of Croatia joining the NATO Part-
nership for Peace programme. According to some an-
nouncement the very important negotiations regarding the
ascension of the WTO should be concluded very soon.
By ascending this organisation, Croatia will reaffirm both
its economic strength and its willingness to participate side
by side with other states in the global association of na-
tional economies. The current successful presidency over
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the Central European Initiative, which gained its confir-
mation in the recently very successfully organised minis-
terial summit on the islands of Brijuni, the nearly com-
pleted bilateral agreements regarding free trade with all
CEFTA members, as well as the recently approved mem-
bership in the Danubian Commission, clearly prove that
the door leading to Central Europe is opening to Croatia.
Simultaneously, bilateral talks are being held with repre-
sentatives of the Mediterranean countries who respect the
fact that the Republic of Croatia is also a Mediterranean
country. Based on their reactions, it may be concluded
that the Republic of Croatia will become a fully fledged
member of those regional associations in the foreseeable
future.
As we are undergoing the period of globalisation
and mutual interdependence, it is very important to stress
that when it comes to joining European and trans-Atlantic
associations Croatia does not have an alternative. Irre-
spective ofthe lack of understanding, even pressures which
come from these associations, Croatia must constantly
demonstrate its affiliation with Europe. This it will do best
by reinforcing the internal stability based on democracy
and the rule of law, by protecting citizens' and minority
rights, reinforcing a market economy and welfare state.
These standards Croatia wants to apply not only as a down
payment for its future membership in the EU and NATO,
but primarily in its own interest and for the advantage of
all its citizens. •
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A new European security architecture is rap-
idly being created. Changes have taken place in both
organisation and substance.
In an organisational and structural sense, the
changes are visible at first glance.
NATO has expanded powerfully to the east
and south of Europe. Through the Partnership for
Peace plan, the young democracies are being
stabilised and prepared for full membership of the
NATO collective security system. OSCE has grown
out of its conference beginnings and become an
organisation, considerably expanding its membership
among the newly created states. After OSCE served
for decades as a cold-war mechanism for relaxing
tension and control of escalation in the arms race,
now it has a growing role as a security organisation
covering almost the whole of the northern hemisphere
and in stabilising the regions and states in transition.
The WEU is also adapting itself to the vigorous pro-
cesses of European integration, in depth and across
the board, and has become an independent western
European instrument for defence and foreign policy.
There are two opposing tendencies in the pro-
cess of the complete breaking-down of cold-war bi-
polarity in post-wall Europe. Western countries, par-
ticularly the USA, are interested in expanding NATO
to the countries of the former eastern bloc. The Rus-
sian Federation wants to stop this process or slow it
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down, at the very least. The expansion of NATO is
not a real security threat to Moscow, rather a threat
to its status. The main Russian foreign policy effort
is directed towards the preservation of super-power
status for Russia, and the process of NATO expan-
sion reduces the sphere of influence of Moscow in
the regions of eastern Europe that for centuries Mos-
cow considered its own backyard. The inexorable
creation of a new European collective security sys-
tem, a more all-embracing process than the simple
expansion of NATO ,will probably result in new com-
promises in relations between the enlarged NATO
and Russia, likely to be broader than the current re-
lationship of partnership. It is impossible to imagine
a new European collective security without specific
security arrangements with the Russian Federation
and consideration being given to its interests in sta-
tus and security.
Moscow is attempting to slow down the geo-
graphical expansion of NATO, arguing that OSCE
should become an umbrella security organisation for
the whole of the northern hemisphere, which is be-
ing resisted by western countries, especially the US.
In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the role of
the OSCE as a security mechanism for crisis man-
agement and for the democratisation of the coun-
tries in transition is growing. Nevertheless, western
countries will continue to prevent OSCE growing
into a hard and fast treaty organisation like the UN.
In terms of substance too, the new European
regional security has changed thoroughly.
What is the new concept
of European regional security?
In practice, the NATO alliance no longer pri-
marily serves as a defensive system for the collec-
tion defence of the USA and western Europe. The
main aim of the NATO alliance is not any longer
keeping up militarily with its competitor. Working
militarily and politically outside the area of its mem-
bers, NATO has become an instrument for dictating
conditions and guarantees of peace in various un-
stable countries in transition. NATO is also an in-
strument for the democratisation of these societies
through a relationship of partnership, joint military
exercises and professional training and
standardisation of the armed forces of these coun-
tries. The aims of this influence are to reduce the
costs of defence, to increase transparency, to con-
tribute to the relaxation of tension, standardisation,
and civilian control over military structures. NATO
has become an important instrument for the
westernisation of those societies in transition that
have such an ambition and vocation.
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WEU is looking for a place for itself in the
strengthening of the military and political indepen-
dence of the western European countries as a counter-
balance to American leadership and as an instrument
of the defensive transparency and co-ordination of
the members of the Union. In a sense as well, the
WEU also acts as an instrument for the stabilisation
of the regions in its neighbourhood (the naval block-
ade at Otranto during the time of the sanctions on
ex-Yugoslavia, the umbrella role in the Albanian cri-
sis and so on).
The OSCE for these reasons still mainly acts
as a conference in which decisions are made by con-
sensus and have a political and not a legal force.
There is no likelihood of the Permanent Council of
OSCE or any other organ ofOSCE getting authority
similar to that of the UN Security Council. Never-
theless, in the years to come to a certain extent one
should expect the continuation of institutional isat ion
and the accumulation of institutional memory. OSCE
also still plays an important role in negotiations about
arms control or the verification of the implementa-
tion of earlier agreements about arms reductions and
the balance of forces. Nevertheless, the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the new political map of Eu-
rope have brought about a completely new military
and political situation that no longer corresponds to
the previously established balances. That is why fu-
ture negotiations inside OSCE will be concerned with
the total elimination of certain weapons and further
reductions, and less about the maintenance of bal-
ances established earlier between the European west
and east. It can be expected that one of the main ef-
forts in the area of arms control will be directed to
the prevention of the transfer of weapons of mass
destruction from the former Soviet bloc and the Rus-
sian Federation to undemocratic regimes, terrorist
groups and criminals.
The main role of OSCE today, then, is no
longer to establish and implement balances offorces
and measures for the relaxation of tension. On the
contrary, OSCE has turned into a mechanism for cri-
sis control and, on the other hand, an instrument for
the stabilisation and democratisation of countries in
transition. This refers particularly to post-conflict
societies in which questions such as national recon-
ciliation, the return of refugees and displaced per-
sons, human and civil rights, and post-war recon-
struction have an important political and security
dimension.
The main areas of work of OSCE have be-
come areas of broader definitions of national and
regional security, such as:
- parliamentary control of the armed forces
- the depolitisation of the army
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- a military code of behaviour
- war and humanitarian law,
- training observers for work in other countries,
- supervision of the freedom, fairness and regularity
of elections,
- protection of minority and human rights,
- freedom of the media
- the role ofNGOs
- the openness of society,
- economic and social equality, and so on.
In some countries, like Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Albania, the OSCE has a very broadly based
mandate through which, in collaboration with other
international mechanisms, after a period of war or
anarchy, it can carry out the initial establishment of
various levels of government and the reinforcement
of democratic institutions until such time as they are
able to function independently, without international
supervision or guardianship.
In many other eastern European lands, OSCE
missions are small, focussed on certain ofthe politi-
cal problems essential for regional security or inter-
nal security in these countries, such as: the position
of the Russian minority in the Baltic countries, in
the Crimea and Ukraine; the (non)withdrawal of the
Russian army from Moldova; the status of the Rus-
sian Skrunda radar station in Latvia; preventing the
conflict from spilling over into Macedonia; the un-
derdevelopment of democratic institutions in
Belarus; mediating in conflicts in Abhazia, Chechnya
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each of these missions is
specific, depending on the character of the problem
in which the OSCE is mediating and reporting about.
The substance of the mandate is mostly limited by
the political views of the belligerents or the govern-
ment on whose territory the mission is working. The
foreign policy position of these countries depends
very largely on reports by OSCE missions, accord-
ing to which the attitudes of regional organisations
and individual countries are determined.
Everything, then, points to the modern Euro-
pean definition of internal and international stabil-
ity for the next millennium putting the democratic
and developmental criteria of security above mili-
tary factors. Regional networks, compatibility, and
integration into a system of collective security are
more important than real individual military power
or bilateral military alliances, geopolitical advantages
or propinquity in terms of ideology and culture.
At the bottom of this trend is a conviction that





- the rule of law and order,
- an open society,
- transparency of social mechanisms,
- the reinforcement of the public and NGOs
- economic and political pluralism,
- ethnic, religious and ideological toleration,
- media freedoms,
- developmental interdependence and complemen-
tarity,
- social mobility.
The European concept of regional security and
stability on the threshold of the new millennium is a
post-modern concept in which national, political and
state identities constitute a welcome diversity in tech-
nological competition and creative reciprocity. In the
post-ideological age the concept of the creative in-
terpenetration of civilisations is superior to the con-
flict of civilisations concept. The concept of secu-
rity through the control of territory and military bases,
or the balance of military forces, is being abandoned.
The world is dominated and influenced by the flow
of information, technology, ideas and people. The
efforts being made by NATO, OSCE, WEU and other
mechanisms from this point of view in the societies
in transition are directed towards equalising and co-
ordinating the parameters of development, technol-
ogy, security and world-view.
Unfortunately, many of the problems with
which the organisation still deals are from the pre-
modern age. The collapse of communist federations
in eastern and south-eastern Europe created, some-
times accompanied by bloodshed, new states in
which nationalist instincts and priorities are still pre-
dominant on the political scene. Hard-won freedom
and great losses and sacrifices, as well as objective
difficulties in development in these economically and
morally shattered societies do not create a fertile soil
for the new humanist definition of European secu-
rity and stability. From this point of view post-con-
flict and anarchic societies are a clot in the blood-
stream of the new Europe. Belatedly, but still in time,
Europe is realising that the stability of these coun-
tries and their being integrated into Europe consti-
tute the central problem of the new European regional
stability.
How the conflict in ex -Yugoslavia
affected the evolution of
the concept of European security
The conflict in ex-Yugoslavia had the most
effect on the change in the substance of European
security, and the influence of this regional crisis,
which is now shifting deeper into the south-east, is
~----
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continuing. This particularly refers to the role ofre-
gional mechanisms in peace negotiations and post-
conflict stabilisation. The area of south-east Europe
is still a laboratory for a new kind of European co-
operation in the domain of security.
The implosion and entropy of communist
structures was particularly complex in the multi-na-
tional federations. Communism did not collapse pri-
marily because of external pressure, rather because
of internal national and social movements in the so-
cialist countries, because of an indigenous need for
reform and opening up. Without the belated national
revolutions it was not possible to start the transfor-
mation of these authoritarian societies into multi-
party democracies, market economies and open so-
cieties. This belated or regenerated politogenesis,
which was completed in other European states in
previous centuries, and rampant exploitative capi-
talism, the consequence of war and conditions of
anarchy, as well as the absence of a democratic tra-
dition, led to the appearance of a non-modern, frus-
trated concept of sovereignty in some of the states in
transition.
European and global security organisations
and methods of crisis management were not at the
beginning ready to cope with these challenges, be-
cause they functioned on the defence philosophy of
bipolarity and isolation from the infectious influences
of the environment. At the end of the 80s and begin-
ning of the 90s, European security architecture still
functioned on the "balance of terror" in a bipolar
system built in such a way as to stop local crises
escalating into a wider conflict. The classic peace-
keeping strategy of the UN was also tuned to freeze
rather than to solve problems. The collapse of the
Warsaw Pact and the liberation of eastern Europe
took European security structures by surprise, for
these were not ready to cope with the disintegration
of communist federations and the internal ferments
in post-communist societies. Instead of adjusting
rapidly to these new realities organisationally and in
terms of substance, the European powers then were
not able to stand up to the challenge of the classic
balance of forces and the need to fill the power
vacuum created by the post-communist implosion.
The paralysis of international mechanisms in
the face of the demands posed by the looming trag-
edy in ex-Yugoslavia was caused by the inappropri-
ateness of the instruments, and also by the lack of
political will and unanimity among the great pow-
ers. The USA was occupied with the war in the Gulf,
and let the EC get on with the management of a cri-
sis in its own backyard. There was a powerful fear
that open support to the national liberation struggle
in Yugoslavia might be an overture to a still more
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violent disintegration of the USSR, which might put
the enormous Soviet nuclear and military potential
outside political control In the perception of the west,
the Helsinki principle of the inviolability of fron-
tiers had priority over the right to self-determina-
tion. The west cherished the illusion that the com-
plex crisis in Yugoslavia after Tito could be solved
by economic development.
The UN was brought in to mediate a peace
after the EC demonstrated its lack of unity and its
impotence, but only as an instrument to freeze the
situation, first in Croatia, and then in Bosnia, and
preventively in Macedonia. The Cyprus-style solu-
tion applied to the conflict did not stop the escala-
tion because it did not touch the roots of it. Promot-
ing the approach of diplomatic mediation, depend-
ing on the good will of the belligerent parties, the
international community actually championed the
right of might. Ultimately, the west was prepared for
a Croatian Tiananmen if Serbia could impose itself
as a regional policeman. After the victims of Serbian
aggression offered stiff resistance, however, Euro-
peans had to be prepared for moral and territorial
compromises so that the conflict could be brought
to an end.
How and why was force
finally demonstrated and employed?
This happened gradually, with hesitations,
with many built-in fall-back points that were not only
political but also institutional. For the first time in
history, Yugoslav wars were transmitted live every
day. The brutality of the siege of the cities, the ran-
dom murders of civilians, ethnic cleansing, concen-
tration camps and mass rapes, the taking of the in-
ternational hostages troubled the international pub-
lic with the worst memories of genocide. Public out-
rage exerted a strong pressure on western govern-
ments. The Islamic countries were united in their
support to the Bosnian Muslims, seeing a conspiracy
against Islam in the tepid reaction of the west. The
blond third world in the heart of Europe, the geno-
cide and culturocide could no longer be ignored. The
problem was of an ideological nature too. The west
was aiming at a new European and world order. In
an interdependent world of open societies and mar-
kets there was no room for xenophobic, fascist ideas
of blood and soil, ethnic purity and territorial con-
quests. The anachronisms of premodern societies
could not be tolerated on the threshold of the post-
modern third millennium.
America got into the game with hesitation to
ensure the leadership and unity of the west and to
prevent other power centres being antagonised. It did
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this after a long period of neoisolationist hesitation,
troubled by the Vietnam and Somali syndromes, and
by the uncomfortable responsibility of being the only
remaining superpower. The regional crisis in ex-Yu-
goslavia was creating a deep rift between American
allies, was alienating Russia and the Orthodox world,
eroding the credibility of the UN and NATO, and
polarising the Islamic world against the west. The
US, more powerfully than the pragmatic and oppor-
tunist Europeans, were forced to defend the interna-
tional order, meaning above all the principles of sov-
ereignty, the inviolability of international borders,
open, multi ethnic societies and human and civil
rights. Otherwise, ex-Yugoslavia might have been
the Pandora's box of similar territorial, ethnic and
ideological disputes right round Europe. In a later
phase, and for the same reasons, the US mediated in
Ulster, Cyprus, in Kosovo, Macedonia and else-
where.
Washington sought peaceful solutions that
were based on a regional balance of forces, not on
the total defeat of one side that would have threat-
ened the unity of the Contact Group, difficult to
maintain anyway. This was achieved through the
growing power of Croatia and the military and po-
litical alliance of Croats and Muslims renewed in
the Washington and Dayton agreements. Air and
naval power was used selectively and limitedly, to
send messages and to regulate the process. After the
cooling of the war machine in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
a de facto international protectorate was set up, the
focus of the management of this regional crisis be-
ing Albania, and now Kosovo.
NATO changed most in this process. The
change was more operative than institutional For the
first time in its long history NATO acted in a combat
role, and, what is more, outside the NATO countries
as a guarantor and as an active peacemaker, and partly
as a police force and a machine for economic recon-
struction. For the first time in the sensitive military
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Russian forces
were involved, as were units from some NATO can-
didates. From a defensive military alliance, intro-
verted and exclusive, NATO had evolved into a
persuader, a guarantor, and manager of the internal
and regional crises derived from the enormous prob-
lems of the countries in transition. NATO became
an instrument for wider European collective secu-
rity, even without formal treaties and the expansion
of its membership, a champion of democratisation
and transparency, and of democratic control of the
army and control of weaponry in the new democra-
cies and troubled regions.
The experience in ex-Yugoslavia required






arms control, peace mediation and the
democratisation of the questions of defence and se-
curity, should be subject to a thorough legal, doctri-
nal and tactical overhaul.
The OSCE was the institution that most
changed the form and contents of its work in this
way through its operations in ex-Yugoslavia. It had
an indispensable role in implementing key elements
of the Dayton Agreement, especially in the success-
ful implementation of Article 2 of Annexe IB of the
Dayton Peace Agreement and in promoting Article
5, which expanded the arms control measures and
surveillance measures to the countries in the
neighbourhood of the area of ex-Yugoslavia, involv-
ing them indirectly in the existing regional arms con-
trol systems.
In B-H the role of the OSCE was irreplace-
able in: the establishment of democratic institutions,
the division of government in the complex structure
ofB-H, the organisation and supervision of elections,
democratisation of the armed forces, promotion of
reconciliation and trust, the freedom of the media,
coexistence and so on. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, along-
side SFOR, the military guarantor of peace, the
OSCE was most important for the stabilisation and
regulation of the internal political life of B-H. In
Croatia it played the leading role in observing and
advising the Croatian government in the period after
the UN presence and the total integration of the coun-
try. In Macedonia too the organisation stabilised
political and ethnic relations. The OSCE has not yet
been brought in to mediate in the inflamed Kosovo
crisis, but observers of the organisation are already
on the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Belgrade has to
co-operate with the OSCE if it wants to find a way
back into the organisation and out of formal isola-
tion and the eternal wall of sanctions. The OSCE
played a key role in the relatively rapid halt to the
anarchy in Albania. OSCE election observers work
in all the countries of ex-Yugoslavia. The OSCE, as
well as specialising in peacemaking, is also involved
in the post-conflict stabilisation of societies in tran-
sition.
The current and future role
of the OSCEin Croatia
The OSCE and the Council of Europe are the
only broad European regional organisations of which
the Republic of Croatia is a full member. In a way
they are a kind of antechamber or purgatory through
which Croatia might be able to achieve its ambition
to join the EU and NATO. The OSCE mission in
Croatia, the most important international presence
in the country, has an umbrella mandate to co-ordi-
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nate all other international mechanisms operating in
Croatia. Accordingly, the reports and opinions of the
OSCE missions in Croatia about how the country fulfils
its international obligations are reading-matter according
to which NATO and the EU and the UN SC define their
political attitudes to Croatia. The OSCE Mission in Croatia
is a kind of evaluation commission about the democratic
readiness of Croatia for gradual improvement of its rela-
tions with European associations.
The work of the Mission in the RC is not given
enough public prominence, probably because it is less
spectacular than other forms of international presence.
There is also satiation in Croatia, an exaggerated sensi-
tivity on the part of the Croatian public because the inter-
national community still feels it needs to keep Croatia
under a magnifying glass, as well as because of the previ-
ous build-up offrustration about the inefficacy of the in-
ternational presence. The work of the OSCE is more in
the public eye when it seems to go too far in its work, as
was the case with the critiques of the history textbooks, .
TV programmes and newspaper reports. This is under-
standable psychologically, but politically not very useful
because of the importance of the Mission with respect to
the overall international position of the Republic of
Croatia.
The OSCE Mission has been present in Croatia for
years; however, its role was previously less visible, being
overshadowed by other, more robust mechanisms of in-
ternational mediation. The Mission has grown in numbers
to about 250 international employees, and has expanded
its mandate in Croatian society in its post-conflict state.
The mandate of the Mission is to advise and help
the Croatian government in internal stabilisation, in the
two-way return of refugees, reconciliation, the strength-
ening of democratic institutions, the protection of minor-
ity rights, the freedom of the media ... The mandate has
been deliberately widely drawn to provide role flexibility
and to let the Mission shift its priorities when helping the
Croatian government and reporting to the international
community about the situation in Croatia.
The Mission is fairly easily accepted because it was
considered most important to get rid of the Transitional
Administration and the authority of the SC, because the
situation in Croatia was no longer a threat to international
security, and because this kind of role of this regional
organisation was accepted much earlier. It turned out that,
although the OSCE had not army on the ground, no ex-
ecutive government or sanction mechanisms, negative re-
ports by the Mission were not without consequences, and
that they could be painful, and harmful to Croatian inter-
ests, particularly international interests.
In the approach to the role and mandate of the
OSCE, there are two opposed schools of thought in the
Croatian government and in the public.
The first holds that reintegrated Croatia, after years
of wartime losses and international mediation and guard-
ianship, has to shake off international supervision, take
its fate into its own hands, and take care first of all to
strengthen the sovereignty attained with so much diffi-
culty, stop Croatia being pushed into any new kind of
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Balkan union, and look after, above all, the return and
well-being of the Croats, who were the first and hardest-
hit victims of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The growing intention of the international community to
be present in various spheres of political and public life is
construed as an intention to overthrow the current gov-
ernment, to destabilise Croatia and, in general, as a con-
spiracy. Those who believe this think that Croatia has to
resist even at the cost of sanctions, isolation and thus au-
tomatic departure from the OSCE and other international
observer mechanisms.
The other school of thought considers that there is
nothing unusual or demeaning in an international pres-
ence in a post-conflict society and in a country in transi-
tion, because there are such mechanisms in most coun-
tries of this type. Since this international interest cannot
be avoided, then it should be used intelligently for the
democratisation of the country, for help in reconstruction
and for more raid approach to European unification. Any
opposite policy, they think, would lead to a kind of autism
that would bring Croatian society to economic collapse,
result in a new war in B-H, the growth of authoritarian
tendencies, the abolition oflaw and order and the rule of
a single party, in short, to a society of inequality and in-
justice. Croatia has no alternative but to be co-operative
and transparent. The international community is not en-
gaged in a conspiracy against a young Croatian state, but
simply wants internal and regional stability for an area
that has for years been an obstacle in the way of wider
processes of unification and stabilisation in the European
continent. It is not a matter of attempts to suffocate the
young state of Croatia and merge it into some wider frame-
work of regional, Balkan unification, but of the renewal
of the normal regional circulation, which then cements
peace on the basis of development, democracy, interde-
pendence and toleration of diversity. The international
community does not have the sensibility or the time to
accommodate itself to our emotional, ethnic and histori-
cal over-sensitivity, because it considers it an immature
concept for the future. The world will not accept our at-
tempts to revise the injustices of history as a ground for a
definition of the new Europe, because this would be to
open the way up to a great deal of national and territorial
revanchism, say the representatives of this way of think-
ing.
This division in the public at large and in the gov-
ernment is most dramatically revealed in connection with
the question of the return of Serb refugees from inside
Croatia and from surrounding countries. The first school
of thought sees in it a threat to Croatia, an attempt to
destabilise it through a Serb fifth column and European
regional condition making. The second school of thought
thinks that Croatia, as moral and military victor, has no
need to be afraid of returning Serbs and should in this
case show that Croatia is a humane, open and tolerant so-
ciety capable of forgiving, an example to others in the
region. Anyway, they say, the number of Serbs who want
to come back is relatively small, and they can be con-
trolled so that they should not cause any instability. Those
who want to homogenise the nation once again against
The United States
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the world do not actually want further democratisation but
a continuation of exploitative capitalism and political ar-
bitration in all spheres of life.
The divisions in the Croatian public and govern-
ment about this question and others, on which the interna-
tional position of the country depends, has brought Croatia
closer than ever to sanctions. All this means that those of us
who are involved in the Croatian diplomatic effort have to
attempt the difficult task of reconciling these obvious op-
positions in the interests of the state and for the good of its
citizens.
There are elements of truth in both approaches, but
morally and in all soberness one's predilection must be
against any Croatian autism. At the international level
Croatia has to maximise its effects, and inside the country
has to channel domestic differences through the demo-
cratic institutions of the political system. International
surveillance, observation and interference are not always
pleasant, and sometimes are degrading. Our attitude to
them however cannot be a clumsy threshing around. The
main reason the international community, through the
OSCE Mission, is interfering more and more critically and
in detail in the public and political life of Croatia is in the
growing mutual distrust that is the result of the opposing
viewpoints already mentioned in the public and the gov-
ernment, viewpoints that clash in an unproductive way.
79
There is not such a great problem in the formulations of
procedures and other documents and instructions that the
Croatian government accepts, rather in the distrust shown
by the international community with respect to Croatia's
most recent intentions. Croatia sometimes takes on inter-
national commitments too lightly, and then does not carry
them out to the letter, reducing its international credibil-
ity. This situation is made use of by countries and services
that via their network in Croatia would like to further their
own particular interests, equating the historical guilt of
Serbia and Croatia. We must not help assist them in this.
The solution, then, lies in restoring mutual trust
between Croatia and the international community. The only
way for the OSCE to stop laying down the law about our
television programmes, history text books or judicial pro-
cedures is to have the required official explanation be-
lieved in the world. Fewer and fewer observers will be
met in the field in Croatia, and more and more European
experts who will assist Croatian society in making its regu-
lations, standards and behaviour fit the standards and ex-
pectations of the developed world to which it both aspires
and belongs.
It is not up to the Croats to change the destiny of
the world, but, with their new state, the Croats have a
chance to change their own, making it a harmonious part
of a developed and integrated Europe. •
David T. Jarvis
Societies tom by internal conflict are a com-
mon feature of the contemporary international land-
scape. Whether in Chechnya, Algeria, the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, or Sri Lanka, peoples in
many countries are fighting each other. While more
visible perhaps at the end of the cold war, divided
societies have been an international reality for years.
Roy Licklider has identifies 84 such wars between
1945 and 1990. These were of two general types:
wars fought over socio-economic and/or political
issues, e.g., Vietnam, Cuba and Haiti, and conflicts
on the basis of identity, e.g., Northern Ireland, the
former Yugoslavia, and Cyprus. This article will at-
tempt to make some generalizations about Ameri-
can policy in these diverse cases. First, it will look
to the past by reviewing. U.S. policy during the cold
war. Then, it will consider the Clinton administra-
tion by examining its policies and the dilemmas
which have resulted.
A Brief Historical Review
The United States was involved in many in-
ternal conflicts in the years after 1945. It sent large
numbers of troops to Korea and Vietnam, provided
large amounts of assistance to embattled governments
in Greece, Taiwan, and El Salvador, and promoted
unrest in Cuba, Nicaragua, the Congo, and Chile. To
cite merely the most extensive and geographically
remote involvement, there were 550,000 American
troops in South Vietnam in 1968, despite the fact
that that country is literally halfway around the world
from Washington, D.C. While the U.S. employed
many tactics, the purpose of these initiatives was
